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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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
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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda



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21 NOVEMBER 1973
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ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

USSR ASSESSES EFFECTS OF "NEW ELEMENTS" IN MIDEAST SITUATION

While Soviet reportage on developments continues to focus on alleged Israeli cease-fire violations and obstruction of the 11 November Egyptian-Israeli agreement, a PRAVDA article on the 16th attempts to put the October war in some sort of perspective. PRAVDA's Demchenko and panelists in the weekly radio roundtable on the 18th enumerated the changes in the Middle East situation brought about by the war, with Demchenko pointing to a new "psychological atmosphere" engendered by military, economic and political circumstances. Demchenko and the roundtable observers summarized Moscow's view of the new elements: an end to the myths of Israeli invincibility and of Arab military incompetence; increased Arab unity which, the roundtable panelists noted, "ought to be strengthened even further"; Arab use of oil as a political weapon; increased international isolation of Israel as evidenced by African and West European attitudes; and the "important positive changes" in Soviet-American relations.

PRAVDA went on to support Security Council Resolution 338's call for implementation of Resolution 242 and for talks between the sides, and like other comment pressed for Israel's withdrawal to the 22 October positions. Like Kirilenko in his October Revolution anniversary speech on the 6th, Demchenko acknowledged the complexity of the situation but concluded that favorable conditions exist for resolving the crisis.

Kosygin, speaking at the luncheon for a visiting Guinean delegation on the 15th, did not depart from stereotyped themes in declaring that there could be no dependable peace in the Middle East without settlement of the "main issue"--Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories. He gave priority to "immediate implementation" of Security Council Resolution 338 of 22 October and reiterated that the USSR was prepared to continue giving the utmost assistance to this.

EFFECT OF DETENTE Moscow has given publicity to a spate of statements and supporting comment underlining the importance of detente with respect to stopping the Middle East fighting and working toward a stable settlement. Thus Brezhnev was cited by TASS and Moscow radio on the 17th as saying, "in an NBC television interview," that improvement of relations

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between the Soviet Union and the United States promoted the achievement of the agreement on a cease-fire. TASS on the 15th reported that President Nixon, in his speech to the National Association of Realtors that day, pointed to the need for cooperation of the great powers in achieving a peaceful Middle East settlement and declared that summit-level talks with the Soviet Union therefore "will be continued."

Both Moscow radio on the 14th and PRAVDA the next day noted that Deputy Secretary of State Rush had observed that the detente in Soviet-U.S. relations "withstood the test of the military conflict" in the Middle East and that Soviet-American cooperation was "an essential condition for further progress" in a peaceful settlement. (But Rush was cited in another context by IZVESTIYA on the 17th when it said that he had declared U.S. determination to make up Israel's loss of military equipment and used the "hackneyed argument" of a need to maintain the military balance.)

Similarly, Arbatov, director of the USA Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, remarked at a 15 November meeting on the 40th anniversary of Soviet-U.S. relations that events in the Middle East confirmed the significance of the favorable changes in Soviet-U.S. relations. There is no doubt, TASS quoted him as saying, it would have been much more difficult to stop the war in that area without these changes and without tireless work to improve relations. Both Demchenko in PRAVDA and the roundtable panelists offered the same opinion.

CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT Soviet coverage of developments continues to focus on alleged Israeli-cease-fire violations--with TASS providing almost daily accounts of UN reports of Israeli-initiated incidents--and again stresses Israel's refusal to withdraw to the 22 October cease-fire positions. Moscow has followed the efforts to implement the six-point cease-fire stabilization arrangement, which Soviet media refer to as the "11 November protocol on observing a cease-fire, halting military operations, and returning forces to the 22 October positions."

As the sides attempted to work out the last four points of the 11 November agreement--on supplies to Suez, nonmilitary supplies to the Egyptian Third Army, replacement of Israeli checkpoints on the

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Cairo-Suez road by UN forces, and exchange of prisoners of war-- Moscow ignored the crucial POW issue pressed by the Israelis and concentrated on the other three points, critical for Egypt. It accused Israel of failing to implement the "entirely clear clauses" of the 11 November agreement on establishment of UN checkpoints, passage of nonmilitary supplies and provision of food, water and medicines to Suez.

When implementation of the last four points was worked out in an agreement reached on 14 November, TASS on the 15th, like the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY the day before, broke the news by way of reporting a UN spokesman's press conference in Cairo. TASS briefly noted that according to the agreement, Israel would remove checkpoints on the Suez-Cairo road and this would be followed by an exchange of prisoners of war. Since then, Moscow has duly noted the POW exchange while pressing for implementation of the second point of the 11 November agreement on "discussions to settle the question" of the return to the 22 October positions. Demchenko observed in his 16 November PRAVDA article that the Egyptian Government was "quite reasonably insisting" on this point, which was laid down in the 11 November protocol. Implementation of this demand would show, Demchenko said, whether Israel was really ready to abandon its confrontation with the Arab countries.

Mrs. Meir has been derided for declaring that the 22 October lines did not exist, IZVESTIYA on the 16th dismissing Israel's "absurd assertions" that these positions "are something 'far-fetched, unreal and illusory.'" Moscow apparently has not explicitly acknowledged Mrs. Meir's proposal that Egyptian forces withdraw from the east side of the canal and Israelis from the west with a UN peace-keeping force on each bank. According to American press reports, the Israeli prime minister had advanced such a suggestion during her early-November talks in Washington, and she made this proposal in her 13 November Knesset speech and a 16 November television interview. TASS on the 3d, in reporting Mrs. Meir's Washington visit, had said that she proposed "a so-called reciprocal evening out of the cease-fire line" and had declared that Israeli forces would not leave the west bank of the canal. A TASS dispatch from Cairo on the 20th rejected Tel Aviv's "cynical" proposal "to 'straighten out positions' on both sides of the Suez Canal, which as a matter of fact is tantamount to a proposal to exchange Egyptian territory for another Egyptian territory." TASS noted that Egypt categorically rejected this idea and again demanded an Israeli pullback to the 22 October lines.

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Soviet reportage has not pressed for speedy convening of a peace conference. Demchenko did recall that Resolution 338 of 22 October stipulated the holding of talks under appropriate auspices. TASS on the 19th cited an Egyptian Government spokesman as saying that Egypt wanted the immediate convocation of a peace conference, and it noted that Israel was trying to delay the conference "on a pretext" that parliamentary elections are to take place in Israel in December.

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS Moscow has noted the U.S. announcement of the ending of the air bridge of military supplies to Israel on the 14th and continuation of deliveries by sea, and has occasionally picked up reports of continuing U.S. military re-equipment of Israel. Soviet media have publicized Arab praise of Soviet weaponry used in the October fighting, along with continued replays of Arab expressions of gratitude for Soviet aid and support. An Arabic-language commentary on the 19th, for example, reported that the communist parties of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Iraq, meeting in Beirut, had expressed appreciation for the "comprehensive assistance" the Soviet Union "is presently giving" the Arab countries.

The Demchenko PRAVDA article on the 16th is notable for the most forthright admission of Arab reverses in the fighting; while it approvingly remarked on the Arabs' skillful use of modern combat equipment and their determination in fighting, it conceded that the Syrian troops "had to retreat, digging in on the second line of defense." On the Egyptian front, Demchenko said that as a result of Israeli violation of the Security Council cease-fire resolutions, the Israelis succeeded in cutting the Cairo-Suez road and "cutting off communications" to the Egyptian Third Army holding positions on both banks of the southern sector of the Suez canal.

Moscow welcomed the special session of the ministerial council of the Organization of African Unity held at Algerian request in Addis Ababa 19-21 November to discuss the Middle East situation. There has been little reaction as yet to the planned Arab summit in Algiers on 26 November; PRAVDA reported from Beirut on the 15th on diplomatic activity in Arab capitals in preparation for the summit "to draw up a common strategy" on questions for further settlement of the crisis. TASS has reported without comment Libyan leader al-Qadhafi's arrival in Yugoslavia on the 18th for talks with Tito, but has not mentioned Libyan--and Iraqi--refusal to attend the summit meeting. A TASS commentary on 23 October had lambasted al-Qadhafi for sitting out the war in safety and had defended the cease-fire in rebuttal of al-Qadhafi's vehement criticism of it in a LE MONDE interview.

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MOSCOW EVASIVE ON PALESTINIANS, CALLS FOR "NATIONAL RIGHTS"

Moscow has consistently been reticent about its relationship with the Palestinian resistance organizations, although it has long paid lip service to Palestinian "legitimate" or "inalienable" interests and rights. Support for the "national" rights of the Palestinians has been voiced sporadically at least since the spring of 1971 and was reaffirmed most recently in the joint communique on Tito's 12-15 November talks in Kiev with Brezhnev. This reaffirmation followed on the heels of PRAVDA's 12 November publication of an October Revolution greetings message from Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman 'Arafat praising the USSR's support for Palestinian "national rights and aspirations."

Moscow has shed little light on the implication of "national" rights and has been evasive on the matter of a possible Palestinian state, with infrequent references for the most part downgrading the idea by treating it as an Israeli concept and therefore suspect. Nor has Moscow been any more forthcoming on the notion of a provisional Palestinian government, although a PRAVDA article in August 1972 did advise the Palestinians to form a "national front" with a "political program."

The current references to Palestinian national rights take on added interest given reports in Arab media of the 19 November departure of a Palestinian delegation led by 'Arafat for Moscow. Moscow has not acknowledged the delegation's arrival, nor has it referred directly to the spate of Arab rumors about Soviet advice to the Palestinians regarding the formation of a Palestinian state and a Palestinian government, and participation in a peace conference. Moscow apparently feels that the talks with 'Arafat will have the effect of escalating the pressure on the Palestinians to get their house in order with a view to taking an effective part in the forthcoming peace negotiations.

'ARAFAT VISIT Against the background of recent Arab rumors of an impending 'Arafat trip to Moscow and his reported departure on the 19th, a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in English to Africa on 15 November complained of attempts by Arab papers to distort Moscow's position on the question of solving the Palestinian problem, but failed to indicate the nature of the "insinuations." The broadcast merely asserted, in defense, that the "strong friendly relations" between the USSR and the Palestinian resistance movement were

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evident from Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir 'Arafat's visits to Moscow. It claimed that the Palestinians viewed the Soviet Union as a "true and dependable friend and ally," and that Soviet solidarity with the Palestinians had been stressed to 'Arafat during past Moscow talks.

Communiques and reports on 'Arafat's past visits to the Soviet Union have in fact not been very informative. Communiques were issued on his talks in Moscow, at the invitation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, after visits in February 1970, October 1971, and July 1972. His most recent visit at the invitation of the "organizing committee" of the 1973 world student games in August this year was marked by a "report" in IZVESTIYA on 26 August which said that during his stay he was received by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and other organizations. The report on the talks this year and the 1972 communique both noted only an "exchange of opinions" on the Middle East situation. In both visits, 'Arafat expressed appreciation of Soviet support and assistance to the Palestinian movement and explained Palestinian efforts to "consolidate their ranks"--Moscow long having chided the Palestinians for their failure in this respect.

PALESTINIAN RIGHTS The word "national" was inserted in Moscow's formulation on Palestinian lawful rights at least as long ago as May 1971, when PRAVDA's Middle East specialist Belyayev remarked that an overall settlement must provide for the Palestinian Arabs' just demands on the basis of recognition of their "national rights." Apparently the first inclusion of "national" in this phrase at the elite level came in a 16 August 1972 message from Kosygin to an international conference of solidarity with the Iraqi people. Kosygin's message, as reported by TASS, declared that the Soviet Union would continue to side with the Arab people in their struggle to insure their legal rights, including the "national rights" of the Arab people of Palestine. Kosygin's message came shortly before PRAVDA's 29 August 1972 analysis of the Palestinian resistance movement and its call for the formation of a "national front" with a political program.*

The "national rights" phrase was employed again by PRAVDA on 10 September 1972 and appeared in a joint Soviet-South Yemeni communique of 26 November last year as "the national rights and interests of the Arab peoples, including the Arab people of Palestine." More recently, a Moscow commentary in Arabic on

* The PRAVDA article is discussed in the TRENDS of 30 August 1972, pages 30-32.

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27 July this year said the Soviet Union insisted that any settlement should be based on "fulfillment of the legitimate national rights" of the Palestinian Arabs.

One of the few attempts to define the "rights" came in a commentary by Soviet lawyer Blis'hchenko, broadcast by Moscow in Arabic on 5 March this year. He spoke of the Palestinians' rights to return to their homeland, to receive compensation for damage done to them, and to recover their property. The most important of their rights, he said, was that of determining their own destiny as they wished, without external interference. He explained that the Palestinians themselves "can deal with the question of the form of exercising their right to determine their own destiny."

An article in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS of March 1971, by Alekseyev and Laptev, offered some vague suggestions on the mechanics of self-determination. Stressing that any solution must be premised on Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory and implementation of UN resolutions, it added that as for the future, the Palestinian refugees must determine that themselves "through a referendum under UN aegis or in some other way," in contact with the Arab countries, first of all Egypt and Jordan.

PALESTINIAN STATE Moscow has shown great reluctance to express a view on any form of a Palestinian state. King Husayn's March 1972 proposal for a federated kingdom of Jordan met with an evasive Soviet response,* and in other rare instances when Soviet media have broached the notion, it has generally been in the context of an Israeli concept and therefore inherently suspect. Typifying the pattern, a PRAVDA article by Primakov in December 1967--the first known acknowledgment of the idea in Soviet media since the June 1967 war--cited a remark by an Israeli cabinet minister as registering Tel Aviv's "intention to create a puppet 'Arab' buffer state on the occupied territories." Moscow's only known indication of approval of a Palestinian Arab state came in what seemed to be a trial balloon launched by a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Yiddish to Israel in August 1969.**

* Moscow's guarded reaction to Husayn's proposal is treated in the TRENDS of 22 March 1972, page 32, and 29 March 1972, pages 21-22.

** See the TRENDS SUPPLEMENT of 15 October 1970, pages 1-2, for a discussion of Soviet treatment of a Palestinian state.

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Occasionally Moscow has retreated to history, as in a discussion by R. Petrov of the problem in NEW TIMES in February 1972. Petrov harked back to 1947 when the future of Palestine following termination of the British mandate was under examination in the United Nations. The Soviet Union, Petrov said, proposed a solution that would have secured the right of the peoples of Palestine to self-determination within the framework of a united democratic state or, "if this proved impossible," their right to establish on the territory of Palestine two sovereign states, Arab and Jewish. He added that the "reactionary Arab rulers" of the time submitted to the "diktat" of Britain and the United States, the 1948 war followed, and the Arabs of Palestine were thus prevented from exercising their right to self-determination.

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW DISPLAYS OPTIMISM ON DIPLOMATIC ANNIVERSARY

Moscow marked the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States with news reports and comment highlighting the steady improvement in relations since the Moscow summit. The accent on positive developments was reflected in media treatment of a wide range of bilateral issues such as SALT but including trade and the Middle East where some concern over U.S. actions had been recently apparent. At the same time, Moscow's sensitivity over the potentially divisive impact of the Middle East events was also evident in comment on the diplomatic anniversary.

BREZHNEV INTERVIEW The posture of optimism was typified by the TASS account of Brezhnev's brief NBC television interview on 16 November. On the sensitive issues of trade and the Middle East, Brezhnev displayed confidence about the prospects for an expansion of bilateral trade and went out of his way to stress the cooperative efforts of the two countries in obtaining a cease-fire agreement in the Middle East. The Brezhnev interview capped a series of TASS dispatches reporting remarks by Secretary Kissinger, Deputy Secretary of State Rush and Senator Fulbright that underscored the durability of U.S.-Soviet detente in the face of the stresses and strains of the war.

However, the 15 November speech by USA Institute director Georgiy Arbatov at a Moscow reception marking the diplomatic anniversary clearly reflected anxiety about the effects of the Middle East events. According to a version of the speech broadcast to North America on 16 November, Arbatov argued somewhat defensively that "if we review the hard facts and put aside emotions, we will see that these events have not canceled out all the positive changes that have taken place between the Soviet Union and the United States. On the contrary, they have confirmed them with renewed force." Arbatov also evinced some doubts about the future in urging both sides to capitalize on the opportunities for improving relations: "We cannot be certain it will not be too late if we do not make use of this opportunity." The abbreviated report of the diplomatic ceremony published in the central press made no mention of these remarks and focused instead on Arbatov's optimistic observations. But an anniversary

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article by Yakovlev in the 16 November NEW TIMES conveyed a similar concern in arguing that the war "demonstrated the necessity of putting the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States on a firmer basis."

TRADE Brezhnev's remarks on U.S.-Soviet trade were in keeping with recent media reports of the upward trends in that area, featuring projections of a threefold increase in 1973 over 1972. That the Administration's intentions on trade are no longer publicly suspect was indicated in the 18 November Moscow radio domestic service roundtable on international affairs. As Brezhnev had in his World Peace Congress speech on 26 October, a roundtable observer contrasted the "irresponsible" opponents of expanded trade to the "official political course of their own government."

SALT Comment on negotiations in the strategic realm has also focused largely on positive developments. In keeping with past practice, Moscow has restricted direct comment on the second round of SALT TWO to a minimum. But a 16 November TASS dispatch on the negotiators' agreement to adjourn on the 17th and resume in mid-December went beyond the conventional one-sentence reports on such meetings to note that "in the opinion of the Soviet delegation" the session was "useful and constructive."

It is also noteworthy in this connection that an article in the September issue of QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY pointed to the inhibiting effect of SALT ONE agreements on U.S. strategic arms development--a subject rarely broached in public by Moscow. The article, by USA Institute members Anatoliy Gromyko and Grigoriy Khozin, offered evidence, primarily in decisions to cut back ABM development and deployment, of "a conspicuous slowing of the process of strategic weapons increase in the United States." According to the authors, the initial SALT agreements limit arms "at a level that is markedly lower than the one that would have been attained in the years immediately ahead if these documents had not entered into force."

The only criticism of U.S. positions on related issues has come in press reports on the military budget approval process. A 20 November TASS dispatch on the President's signing of the military procurement bill caustically declared that the legislation "practically satisfies all requirements of the Pentagon for the development of the most up-to-date weapons systems."

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FORCE REDUCTIONS

MOSCOW AND EAST EUROPE CAUTIOUS ON VIENNA TALKS

Early comment by Moscow and its East European allies on the current phase of the force reduction talks that opened in Vienna on 30 October displays their customary caution in treating an issue when they are directly engaged at the negotiating table. Appraisals to date have centered on the main points of Brezhnev's 26 October World Peace Congress speech. While acknowledging the great complexity of the negotiations and the considerable differences that must be bridged, commentators have projected an undercurrent of optimism regarding the prospects for eventual success in the talks.

The spate of comment originated by Moscow and its allies in the past three weeks has generally echoed the USSR's initial negotiating position for the talks as set forth by Brezhnev in his peace congress speech. This includes the positions that the reductions should include air forces and nuclear-armed units as well as ground forces, that they should apply to both foreign and national forces in the territories to be covered by the reductions, and that the cuts should be carried out on the basis of equal numbers or equal percentages, in such a way that neither side would gain an advantage as a result. The Soviets also suggest that initial reductions could begin as early as 1975. Regarding the geographical area to be affected by the reductions, the comment treats the question as all but closed, maintaining that the preparatory talks earlier this year determined the exclusion of Hungary because of NATO's insistence that Italy not be a full participant.

Neither Moscow nor its East European allies has yet alluded to the reports purportedly "leaked" to Western news sources by Soviet "journalists" last week giving the details of a Soviet proposal presented to the force reduction talks. According to these reports, the Soviet plan calls for a reduction in 1975 of 20,000 men for both the Warsaw Pact and NATO, a further 5 percent reduction in 1976, and a 10 percent reduction in 1977. If the leak was intentional, it may have been intended to generate pressure in the West for prompt movement toward substantive discussions of the force reduction issues. Under this interpretation, Moscow's reticence about publicizing the "leak" would not be surprising, since either a show of public advocacy, or a denial, would undermine the effect supposedly being sought by the disclosure.

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USSR - YUGOSLAVIA

BREZHNEV-TITO TALKS IN KIEV PROJECT WARMING TREND

The communique issued at the close of Tito's 12-15 November visit to Kiev reflected the warming trend in Moscow's vacillating relationship with Belgrade. PRAVDA on 12 November, in a notably cordial gesture typifying the current relationship, greeted Tito at the start of his visit with a highly laudatory review of a new collection of his speeches and articles released by Moscow. Entitled "Years of Creative Work," the review traced Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation from the wartime period to the present, with no hint of the 1948 rupture. The Kiev meeting, the third between Brezhnev and Tito in slightly more than two years, along with Premier Kosygin's late September visit to Belgrade, raises the frequency of top-level Soviet contacts with Yugoslav leaders to a level comparable with that displayed by Moscow in dealing with its closest Warsaw Pact allies.

COMMUNIQUE The 15 November communique went beyond previous summit-level documents in indicating a closer relationship between Belgrade, on the one hand, and Moscow and its allies on the other. Thus, it was the first such document to refer to Yugoslavia's ties with CEMA. Another novel feature was the disclosure that the two leaders had discussed "questions of the world communist and working class movement." Such an acknowledgment on the part of the Yugoslavs takes on added significance in view of recent signs that Moscow is pressing for the convocation of a new international communist conference.* The atmospherics of the visit were also described in warmer terms than before: The recent talks were said to have been held "in a friendly atmosphere, in a spirit of mutual understanding and confidence," and there was no mention of "frankness" in the exchanges, as was the case in the communiques on Tito's June 1972 visit to Moscow and Kosygin's recent trip to Belgrade. There was likewise no reference in the communique to the concepts of "sovereignty, equality, and noninterference" underscored in the 1 October 1973 communique and the 10 June 1972 document.

* See the TRENDS of 7 November 1973, pp 19-20.

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At the same time, the communique advanced no claims of unanimity on all questions, indicating merely that the two leaders had "informed each other" on domestic issues and had "an exchange of opinion" on bilateral party and state relations. The theme of "socialist internationalism," underscored in the September 1971 joint statement, was also absent from the present communique, which noted only that Tito's visit would promote the strengthening of bilateral friendship and cooperation "for the good of socialism and peace."

In its roundup of international topics the communique predictably focused attention on the Middle East and reiterated standard Soviet and Yugoslav positions on that subject as well as on detente, Europe, Vietnam, the Chilean coup, and the Algiers nonaligned conference.

In his speech at a dinner for Tito on the 12th, Brezhnev went beyond the language of the communique in stressing policy "coordination" between socialist countries as a basic prerequisite of detente--a staple in Soviet bloc commentary since the late July Crimean conference. The communique, in deference to the Yugoslavs, merely called for "rallying the broadest sections of the world public" in order to consolidate detente. Brezhnev's reference to coordination was subsequently echoed in PRAVDA's 17 November editorial on Tito's visit. Tito, in his speech at the dinner on the 12th, made up for the communique's omission by reminding that "practice has shown" that respect for equality, independence, and noninterference provide a "lasting" basis for bilateral cooperation.

PRAGUE ARTICLE The only discordant note on the occasion of Moscow's efforts to embrace Belgrade was provided by a 17 November Prague RUDE PRAVO article blaming the Yugoslav system as the cause of its oil shortage, experienced even though Yugoslavia has supported the Arab cause. The Czechoslovak paper's Belgrade correspondent placed principal blame for the shortage on Yugoslavia's "decentralized economic policy," as well as on the much criticized targets of Belgrade's ongoing purge, "liberalism and technocratism." The shortage will be eased, RUDE PRAVO added, by "early" shipments of oil from the Soviet Union, Romania, and Bulgaria, as well as from Arab countries, and by the completion of the projected Adriatic oil pipeline in which, it noted, Czechoslovakia and Hungary also have a strong interest.

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INDOCHINA

PRG'S PEKING VISIT STRESSES SOLIDARITY; DIFFERENCES REMAIN

Peking and Hanoi treatment of a high-level PRG delegation's 18-21 November visit to Peking, first stop on a tour of "a number of socialist countries," reflects the usual stress on Sino-Vietnamese solidarity and friendship displayed on such occasions. In sharp contrast with the Vietnamese, Peking, not unexpectedly, maintains circumspection regarding the U.S. role and difficulties in implementing the Paris agreement.

The Peking welcome accorded the PRG delegation, led by Advisory Council Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho and Foreign Minister Binh, compares with that extended to the DRV party-government delegation led by VWP First Secretary Le Duan that visited China in June. Peking leaders warmly hailed the Vietnamese "great victory" in the war against the United States, and the PRG leaders reciprocated with praise for Chinese assistance. These themes were also stressed repeatedly during the Le Duan-led delegation's earlier visit, which set the example for the current PRG delegation's journey, intended to thank allies for backing during the war and to solicit continued support in the new situation in Vietnam. As did the DRV delegation in June, the PRG group has concluded an aid agreement with China which NCNA reported covered the PRG's "gratuitous economic assistance" to the PRG for 1974.

En route to Peking the PRG delegation stopped off on 18 November in Hanoi, where they were received by high-level officials led by Pham Van Dong and Truong Chinh. Defense Minister Giap, whose last previously reported public appearance in early October was for the purpose of escorting Tho during his previous Hanoi visit, was not reported present on the 18th.*

PEKING WELCOME The Vietnamese guests were given a "tumultuous welcome" by "thousands upon thousands" of Chinese upon arrival in Peking on the 18th with Chou En-lai leading

* The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on 4 October cited a Lebanese newspaper report of that date saying that Giap was to visit Syria 15-25 November as a result of an agreement during a July visit to Hanoi by the Syrian defense minister, and that Giap also was to visit Egypt afterward. There have thus far been no monitored reports confirming a Giap Middle East visit. Giap's current absence is discussed in the 31 October TRENDS, pp 24-25.

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the official welcoming delegation at the airport that included five politburo members. Chou also hosted a welcoming banquet at which he and Tho spoke. Tho met with Mao the next afternoon, and in the evening spoke at a Peking mass rally. The PRG delegation departed on the 21st for a tour of China in the company of Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, after giving a reciprocal banquet on the 20th with speeches by Tho and Chou. The Chinese ceremonies for the PRG visitors duplicated those for the Le Duan delegation in June, although the Le Duan group had occasioned a measurably higher-level turnout of PRC leaders, including every active Peking-based politburo member, and Chou En-lai himself accompanied the DRV delegation on its tour of the provinces.

NCNA reported that Tho's visit with Mao took place in an atmosphere of "fraternal friendship." It cited Tho's thanks, in accordance with Ho Chi Minh's will, for Chinese support and noted Mao's promise that China should continue backing "with everything in our power." Attending the meeting on the Chinese side were Chou and Politburo members Li Te-sheng and Chang Chun-chiao.

NCNA reported that Tho and PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien attended signing ceremonies for the aid agreement on the 20th, and that Chinese Foreign Trade Minister Li Chiang and Foreign Minister Binh signed the accord. The new Chinese commitment is a followup to Peking's initial assistance agreement, which NCNA said covered China's "emergency supplementary free economic aid" to the PRG for 1973, that was signed on 19 July during a Peking visit by a PRG economic specialists group.

CHINESE, PRG SPEECHES In their authoritative statements during the visit, the Chinese offered generalized backing for the PRG's "acute and complex struggle" to implement the Paris agreement, but carefully sidestepped endorsement of strong PRG charges against the United States and Saigon as well as its warnings of PRG countermeasures.

The PRG's Tho, consistent with the harder Vietnamese line of recent months, accused Washington and Saigon of complete responsibility for the "present extremely grave situation" in South Vietnam, charging that they have "ever more crudely and systematically" violated many of the "most important provisions" of the Paris agreement. He added that the United States and Saigon have directed "threats and slanders" against the PRG, and specifically accused Washington of harboring an intent to perpetuate "neocolonialism" by keeping Vietnam divided. He warned that

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despite the PRG's "great restraint," it would "strike back" in the face of continued violations, and he called on friendly states to "vigorously support" the Vietnamese communist position against the United States and Saigon.

By contrast, Chinese assessment of the present situation was restricted to a routine recital of Saigon violations, including the noting of recent ARVN bombings of PRG-held areas, while virtually ignoring the U.S. role and remaining silent about PRG warnings of countermeasures in the present "tense" situation. Chou En-lai, in his banquet address of the 18th, avoided repeating the bland demand he had made at a similar banquet for the DRV guests last June--that the United States and Saigon "respect" the Paris agreements and cease violations. The Chinese duly reaffirmed support for the PRG as "the sole genuine representative" of the South Vietnamese people, even though Chou appeared more equivocal in labeling it simply "the authentic representative" in his speech on the 18th.

The situation in Laos and Cambodia was treated routinely, with both sides voicing praise for the Vientiane agreement and support for "head of state" Sihanouk and his five-point stand. Diverging in their view of the overall international situation, the PRG leader called attention to PRG solidarity with the world struggle against "U.S.-led imperialism," while Chou, without mentioning either Moscow or Washington by name, called for international unity against "imperialist contention for hegemony."

BACKGROUND ON PRC RESTRAINT The Peking leaders' speeches and press comment during the current visit represent the first authoritative comment on Vietnam in two months. They confirm China's increasingly moderate public posture on Vietnam issues in the wake of the Paris peace agreement. Although both the DRV and PRG since early October have issued a steady stream of high-level protests over alleged U.S.-Saigon violations of the agreement, portraying the situation as increasingly tense and warning of countermeasures, Peking has avoided authoritative seconding comment. Peking media have duly reported the protests, but except for PRG and DRV government statements, on 9 and 10 November, which were carried textually, they have carefully edited out passages harshly critical of the United States and Saigon or those implying an alarming situation in South Vietnam.

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Peking in the recent past has continued the pattern of following its replay of official Vietnamese communist protest statements with independent Chinese comment. But despite having carried the PRG and DRV government statements earlier this month, Peking offered no supportive articles. This is in contrast to practice during the past half year: PRG and DRV foreign ministry statements on 30 and 31 July prompted a 3 August PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, while DRV and PRG government statements of 30 March and 1 April, respectively, brought a 3 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial.

DRV, PRG PROTESTS CHARGE NEW U.S. FLIGHTS OVER VIETNAM

The DRV and PRG have protested routinely, at foreign ministry spokesman's level, new alleged overflights of their territory by U.S. SR-71 aircraft on 19 November. The PRG statement was unique, being the first PRG protest since the signing of the 28 January cease-fire agreement to accuse the United States of flying manned aircraft over a PRG "liberated zone."

The latest DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, issued promptly the same day the violation allegedly took place, employed mild language virtually identical to that of the 8 November DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on a previous alleged SR-71 overflight. The current statement accused the United States of dispatching SR-71 aircraft "to carry out reconnaissance activities over many provinces and cities, including Hanoi and Haiphong." As did the 8 November protest, the current one declared the United States was in violation of Article 2 of the Paris agreement and the first point of the 13 June joint communique.

The PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, issued on the 21st, two days after an alleged U.S. SR-71 overflight for reconnaissance in the areas of Dong Ha, Ai Tu, and Lao Bao, and along Route 14 "in the airspace of Quang Tri province," employed wording similar to the DRV protests. It called the overflight a "brazen violation" of Article 4 of the Paris agreement.

The only previous PRG protest of U.S. reconnaissance flights over its territory since the cease-fire came on 2 May, when a foreign ministry spokesman's statement alleged such a flight that subsequent media commentary described being carried out by a "pilotless reconnaissance aircraft." Article 4 of the Paris agreement, which states that the United States "will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam," was likewise cited in the May protest statement. As yet there has been no followup commentary by Hanoi or Front media on either of the alleged overflights.

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U S S R

PURGE OF UKRAINIAN IDEOLOGICAL CADRES CONTINUES

The Ukrainian ideological leadership since mid-October has undergone major changes involving replacement of the leaders of the Central Committee Agitprop and culture sections and the ministers of culture and of higher and secondary specialized education. This is the most extensive ideological shakeup since pro-Russian hardliner V. Yu. Malanchuk succeeded F.D. Ovcharenko, a protege of former Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest, as Central Committee ideology secretary in October 1972. This purge leaves the Ukrainian ideological sector with only two important holdovers from the Shelest regime--Minister of Education A.M. Marinich and publishing committee chairman N.K. Belogurov.

The purge caps a year of mounting public pressure against nationalist and cultural deviations in the Ukraine that were tolerated, and at times even encouraged, under Shelest. As an adjunct to this campaign the Ukrainian leadership has sought to bring literary and political dissidents into line through a series of arrests, trials, and public recantations.

PERSONNEL CHANGES The shakeup began with the appointment of Culture Minister Yu. N. Yelchenko as head of the Ukrainian Central Committee Agitprop section in mid-October. Yelchenko, long associated with Ukrainian hardliners and Russifiers, had risen to republic Komsomol first secretary at a time when the Komsomol was controlled nationally by hardliners V. Ye. Semichastnyy and S.P. Pavlov, but was removed in May 1968 during Shelest's shakeup of ideological officials. After a term as party second secretary in Lvov, he became Ukrainian culture minister in November 1971, shortly before the large-scale arrests of Ukrainian dissidents. Yelchenko succeeded I.Z. Orel, a longtime Ukrainian Agitprop official who had been named section chief in mid-1970. Yelchenko was replaced as culture minister by Kiev pedagogical institute director A.K. Romanovskiy. The personnel changes were announced in RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 16 October.

This newspaper the next day identified M.G. Ishchenko as head of the Central Committee's culture section. Ishchenko had previously served for many years as editor of the Central Committee's agricultural paper SILSKI VISTI and was last identified in this post on 14 October. His predecessor,

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P.M. Fedchenko, had been named head of the culture section in early 1968 during Shelest's reorganization of the Ukrainian ideological sections.

Kiev radio on 14 November reported the replacement of Minister of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education Yu. N. Dadenkov by G.G. Yefimenko. Although Dadenkov's ministry has been under criticism by dissident elements for discrimination against Ukrainians, there is some evidence that Dadenkov personally sympathized with the complaints. Dadenkov's successor, Yefimenko, served as deputy minister when the higher education ministry was established in 1955, but he was removed from this post and went into obscurity shortly after Dadenkov became minister in 1960.

RUSSIFICATION CAMPAIGN The recent changes follow a period of intense activity by Shcherbitskiy and Malanchuk to combat Ukrainian nationalism and promote Russification under the guise of developing a "new historic entity, the Soviet people." Although this campaign was well under way last year,* it was intensified after Shcherbitskiy complained at the April 1973 Ukrainian Central Committee plenum of foot-dragging by some officials in cracking down on "unhealthy" ideological manifestations. At an early July conference of Ukrainian editors, reported in the August ZHURNALIST, Shcherbitskiy called on Ukrainian ideological organizations and mass media to "suppress ideological subversion." Malanchuk was reported in the September ZHURNALIST to have complained at the conference that the Ukrainian press had incorrectly interpreted Ukrainian history, idealized the past, and promoted "elements of church ritual" and "ethnographic narrowmindedness." On 17 July, a week after the conference, I.V. Zub, longtime editor of the writers union newspaper LITERATURNYA UKRAINA, was replaced by ultraconservative writer A.M. Khorunzhiy. Khorunzhiy had joined the editorial board as deputy chief editor on 24 October 1972, only days after Malanchuk had become ideology secretary.

Perhaps foreshadowing the removal of Dadenkov from the higher education ministry, Shcherbitskiy and Malanchuk moved to remedy shortcomings in the indoctrination of university students. RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 29 August reported a Ukrainian Central Committee decree criticizing the Zhdanov city party organization

* For background, see the TRENDS of 4 April 1973, pages 23-25.

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for inadequate indoctrination of youth, and a Ukrainian Komsomol Central Committee plenum was held under Malanchuk's supervision on 8 September to discuss improvement of "patriotic and international education of youth." On 3 October Shcherbitskiy addressed a meeting of party members of Kiev State University, and disclosed that the Ukrainian Central Committee recently had discussed university education and planned new measures to improve student indoctrination. As reported in the 5 October RADYANSKA UKRAINA, Shcherbitskiy called for more systematic international education of students and stressed love for the "great Russian people, its culture and language."

CRACKDOWN ON DISSIDENTS The arrests, trials and recantations of Ukrainian dissidents begun last year have continued, according to reports in the Ukrainian emigre press. In February liberal writer Viktor Nekrasov was expelled from the party, and Vyacheslav Chornovil was sentenced to 12 years in prison and exile. In March Ivan Svitlichnyy received a similar sentence, while Yevhen Sverstyuk and Ivan Dzyuba were sentenced to five years imprisonment. In April the secretary of the Odessa oblast newspaper was fired from his job and expelled from the party for associating with dissidents.

Emigre press reports also indicate that in May several Lvov university teachers and students were arrested for protesting Russification and discrimination against the Ukrainian language, literature and history, and that Malanchuk had visited Lvov to investigate. He reportedly ordered a trial of the protestors but was overruled by a commission from Moscow, which limited the punishment to expulsion of the students and dismissal of seven faculty members.

Confirmation of the continuing crackdown has appeared in the Ukrainian press. LITERATURNA UKRAINA on 15 May reported the expulsion of O.P. Berdnik from the writers union for "antisocial acts." At a 23 March writers union meeting reported in the 27 March LITERATURNA UKRAINA, the newly elected writers union chairman Vasil Kozachenko accused Berdnik of disseminating hundreds of "provocative" letters, some of which reached the West and were printed in the emigre press, and of ties with tourist Mikola Gorbach, whose arrest was reported in the 13 March RADYANSKA UKRAINA. Aged dissident writer B.D. Antonenko-Davidovich was also attacked for ties with Gorbach in a vitriolic 13 July LITERATURNA UKRAINA article. LITERATURNA UKRAINA

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on 3 August published a letter from Ivan Ilyenko--whose novelette had come under fire in May--in which he confessed his error in idealizing the Cossacks and underrating their ties with Russian culture. Liberal writer Yevhen Hutsalo also was assailed in a 7 August LITERATURNA UKRAINA article for idealizing the past.

The intimidation campaign yielded a major dividend when the most prominent Ukrainian dissident, Ivan Dzyuba, author of "Internationalism or Russification?" publicly recanted. In a letter published in LITERATURNA UKRAINA on 9 November, Dzyuba renounced his earlier attacks on Soviet nationality policy and pledged to write a new book disproving the claims of Russification in his earlier book. Dzyuba's letter was judged so important that LITERATURNA UKRAINA ran a special issue, rather than waiting until 13 November when the regular issue of the paper was scheduled to appear. The paper reported that Dzyuba had been pardoned by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium for his change of attitude. The contents of Dzyuba's letter were also carried by TASS in English on 13 November.

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NOTES

PRC PROVINCIAL PEASANT ASSOCIATION: The drive to rebuild mass organizations dismantled during the cultural revolution appears to have entered its final lap with Changsha's 18 November announcement of the convening of a provincial congress to elect a new peasant association committee in Hunan, Mao's native province. Recent broadcasts have also reported preparatory meetings for provincial peasant congresses in Shantung and Shensi. Given authoritative sanction in last year's New Year's Day editorial, the campaign has already revived the Communist Youth League, trade unions, and women's organizations. Reconstruction of provincial peasant associations, the traditional channel for mobilizing rural production forces, will complete the process.

CHINESE EDUCATION: Despite new emphasis on the role of politics in education, evident in last summer's nationwide campaign to stress political as well as educational factors in selecting college students, a Shanghai broadcast on 17 November has made a strong call for more study of Western advances in natural science, continuing the broad trend of recent years toward substantive academic research. The broadcast made an unusually strong call for more study of Western advances in natural science. It praised the leadership of Fudan University for paying attention to studying "new trends and developments of schools of thought" and made it clear there are limits on how strongly intellectuals may be criticized, saying those who made mistakes should be criticized, but "their enthusiasm for academic research should be protected." Wooing those intellectuals who still apparently are smarting from their negative experiences during the cultural revolution, the broadcast lauded Fudan's party committee for organizing formal lectures on recent Western developments in modern physics. Academics were instructed to analyze the content of Western theories of natural science in a concrete manner and were put on notice that "no one should refuse outright to do research on such theories."

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HANOI ON KISSINGER'S PRC VISIT: In a striking departure from past practice, Hanoi has reported Secretary of State Kissinger's 10-14 November Peking visit, including explicit details on his activities and talks with Chinese leaders. Hanoi media at first ignored the original announcement on the most recent trip, alluding only vaguely to it in reporting a press briefing by U.S. spokesman John King and citing Kissinger's plans to "visit here and there" in late October. However, on the 25th Hanoi promptly reported the postponement of the visit announced on the 24th. That a new pattern had indeed emerged became clear on 11 November, the day after Kissinger's delayed arrival in Peking, when Hanoi reported his arrival. On the 15th, the day following his departure, Hanoi radio, in a broadcast unusual for its candor in dealing with an obviously sensitive topic, cited NCNA in reporting such details of the Secretary's Peking activities as his talks with Chou En-lai and Chi Peng-fei and his reception by Chairman Mao on the 12th.

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

INCREASED CHINESE ATTENTION TO PEOPLE'S MILITIA

Revitalization of the Chinese militia has long been one of Mao's favorite themes. In late September, the 15th anniversary of his 1958 call to "organize contingents of the people's militia on a big scale" produced a continuing stream of comment on the militia's current status.

Since the fall of Lin Biao two years ago, PRC media have increased their attention to the military role of the militia and laid new stress on civilian party control of the PLA armed forces departments charged with the militia building task. Recent articles, including a 29 September joint editorial on the militia by PEOPLE'S DAILY and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY, have strongly restated the principle that local army units must put militia work first and work under the control of local party committees. A second organizational development, the urban worker militia, has only recently come into prominence during this fall's campaign.

The Mao directive usually cited in PRC media calls for building the militia "organizationally, politically, and militarily." Organizationally, the current militia line is distinguished from Lin's line by its attention to party control of the militia, not just as a general theme but with concrete lines of authority established. One facet of the campaign to establish party supremacy was carried out last year, when local armed forces detachments of the PLA were notified that they must put militia work in first place on their agendas and that the "support the left" tasks assumed during the cultural revolution were now secondary. This order, noted in several provincial broadcasts, served to reduce PLA control over civilian institutions by necessitating withdrawal of PLA forces to attend to their new primary task.

A 28 September NCNA article drew attention to a new organizational reform, the urban worker militia, a "huge militia force with industrial workers as its mainstay." Illustrating Shanghai's tenure as urban militia leader, the article traced the Shanghai organization back to the cultural revolution, when it resisted Lin's efforts to usurp militia leadership under the principle that the "party commands the gun." According to the article, the Shanghai militia from the beginning had conducted all its work

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"under the direct leadership" of the municipal party committee. The Shanghai article stressed the role of the militia in class struggle, but also noted the importance of military training, especially "in spare time." In an obviously coordinated campaign, on 30 September NCNA announced that the militia in Peking, Shanghai, and Tientsin--China's three autonomous municipalities--were celebrating the anniversary of Mao's call and in this context revealed the existence of a Peking worker militia command headed by Peking worker chief and Politburo alternate Ni Chih-fu. Like the previous article on Shanghai, the announcement stressed the role of militia in class struggle while noting the importance of military training.

Few organizational details about the new urban militia organizations have been publicized, other than that they report directly to the municipal party committee. The role of the local PLA authority has been obscure, though most reports note that militia forces join the PLA on patrols as part of their role in ferreting out class enemies and maintaining order. A Changchun broadcast on 18 November, which may be applicable to other municipalities, seems to shed some light on the PLA role, stating that the worker militia command in that city was set up by the city PLA garrison command "in coordination with the Changchun trade union council." The Changchun report, like earlier reports on urban militia building, stresses the guiding role of the municipal party committee, noting that the garrison has respected committee leadership and acted as its staff worker.

The militia's role in production is related to the general principle of party control over the military, for if the militia is primarily a production unit, it does not give the party an independent military organ. This relationship was enunciated by Peking radio on 26 October, when it charged that Lin had designated the militia's central task as a "plunge into production" in order to subvert the power of the state. By disregarding the militia's role in class struggle, the article charged, Lin hoped the militia would "hear only the hum of machinery and ignore the sounds of swords being sharpened."

The military component in militia building, as presented in recent articles, is no different from the line advanced since last year--that military training was neglected by Lin and should now be implemented by integrating production with military affairs. While some short-term, fulltime training of militia has been reported, especially in border provinces, media reports from

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throughout China stress that most training must utilize time not needed for production.

PROVINCIAL REACTION There is no evidence of consistent provincial differences in approach to militia building, other than the expected greater attention paid the issue by border and coastal provinces. Differences in approach in articles from a single province equal or exceed those between different provinces, a situation not surprising in view of instructions in a 22 October PEOPLE'S DAILY article that there are "different conditions of militia work in the city and the countryside" and that militia activities must accord "with actual conditions."

An example of articles in a single province taking widely varying approaches on different occasions may be seen in Anhwei, provincial base of PLA political department chief and party Vice Chairman Li Te-sheng, who is presumably closely involved with militia policy. A 30 September Hefei broadcast reporting Anhwei's celebration of Mao's militia call anniversary stressed party control and noted that in Hefei military training included target shooting with live ammunition. A 20 October broadcast on rural militia activities paid less attention to ideology and stressed the line of integrating manual labor with military training. Hefei radio's report on the provincial militia work conference broadcast on the 23d stressed party control and ideological training, but placed less emphasis on the militia's military role and took only brief note of the militia's role in production. A 25 October account of PLA aid to militia building concentrated almost entirely on aid in harvesting crops, failing to mention military training at all.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 12 - 18 NOVEMBER 1973

<u>Moscow (2592 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1107 items)</u>		
Ties in USSR	(2%)	12%	Domestic Issues	(37%)	41%
[Brezhnev Speech	(--)	3%]	Indochina	(16%)	9%
[Communique	(--)	3%]	[PRG Leader Nguyen	(--)	5%]
Middle East	(4%)	8%	Huu Tho in PRC		
China	(4%)	8%	Kissinger in PRC	(2%)	8%*
Brezhnev Forthcoming	(1%)	4%	Korea	(1%)	8%
India Visit			[UN Debate	(--)	5%]
Kosygin Speech at	(--)	3%	Middle East	(7%)	6%
Minsk Ceremony					
World Peace Congress,	(14%)	3%			
Moscow, 25-31 Oct.					

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* Reports on the Kissinger-Mao meeting totaled some 25 rebroadcasts but are not included in this figure because of brevity.